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Disclaimer: This thought piece contains the encapsulation of views 
presented by the speaker and does not exclusively represent the views 
of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. 
In examining the Five Eyes Intelligence Partnership, there are two 
important issues for students. First, what does it do, and what are its 
advantages for Canada and the Western alliance. Second, is the 
partnership in danger.  
The second question arises now because the President of the United 
States does not attribute value to alliances, or to transnational institutions 
in general. The threat to the low-profile Five Eyes partnership is limited 
but still real. If the risks became reality the progress that Canada has 
made in the past 18 years in putting accurate intelligence at the service 
of informed decision-making would be lost. This would have a direct 
impact on Canada’s ability to contribute to the resolution of the 
problems being discussed at this conference.  
First, what is the Five Eyes partnership? The partnership grew out of the 
intelligence cooperation between the US and the UK during the Second 
World War. The three Commonwealth countries (New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada) added value in part because their geographic 
positions extended SIGINT coverage across the Pacific and north from 
Canada to the USSR. All five countries were allies in both World Wars. 
All faced Soviet internal and global subversion after World War Two. 
They were partners because of both history and circumstance.  
The partnership was natural because the five countries had a common 
heritage in their early history, and except for Canada’s bilingualism, a 
common language. They have close ties across many areas of 
government unrelated to intelligence and security.  
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The first thing to know about this partnership is that contributions are 
not equal. US expenditures on intelligence are very large, and none of 
the partners do, or could, contribute a share proportionate to their 
population size. The budget request in 2018 for the National Intelligence 
Program in the US was $57.7 billion, plus $20.7 for the Military 
Intelligence Program. The UK comes closest. The budget in 2016-17 for 
the three major UK intelligence agencies, not including defence, was 
just under three billion pounds.  
Second, the coverage of the partnership now reaches across multiple 
areas of intelligence and security. Partners have agency structures which 
are similar, or at least operationally compatible. All have defence 
intelligence; all have an anti-terrorist organization. Canada has a 
National Security and Intelligence Advisor in part to line up with the US 
structure. The newly-formed Incident Response Group in the Privy 
Council Office intentionally parallels the UK COBR and similar 
agencies in other partner countries. Canada and New Zealand do not 
have separate foreign intelligence agencies, but they have a foreign 
HUMINT program and established pathways for sharing.  
These parallel structures work together and interact constantly. 
Intelligence and assessments are shared in high volumes. Agencies work 
together as necessary. Liaison visits are frequent and there are dedicated 
or designated liaison officials in the embassies and High Commissions. 
Heads of agencies meet regularly to discuss mutual issues and build 
personal relationships. The level of intelligence flows from the US to 
Canada increased markedly after 9/11. Some agencies also exchange 
secondees.  
Third, the security standards are US standards—for clearances, for 
secure communications equipment, for distribution of materials, and for 
facilities. Without common standards, intelligence sharing would not be 
possible. When a partner country lapses in enforcing standards the 
consequences can be costly.  
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Fourth, the value of the relationship for all partners is similar—access to 
a wider range of intelligence that would not be available to a single 
country. The US comes closest to universal coverage, but even the huge 
American community can’t do everything. The US benefits from the 
specialized capabilities of partners, and their geographic coverage. 
Being able to exchange with partners also provides a check against 
groupthink and cultural biases. Inter-allied exchanges of views can be a 
stimulus for re-checking sources, analysis and conclusions. US partners 
frequently emphasize the value of a different perspective, even where 
the US is able to deploy resources well beyond the capability of partners.  
In other ways, each partner brings something different. The UK has a 
long experience in security and intelligence, a close relationship, for 
now, to European partners, and technical strength. Although still 
unequal, this is the most equal relationship to the US within the Five 
Eyes.  
Canada has emphasized SIGINT as its principal contribution to the 
Alliance, and to long experience adds technical expertise and linguistic 
capacities in multiple languages and dialects.  
Canada and the US are both North American, Atlantic-Pacific nations, 
with broadly compatible orientations on foreign policy issues. Most 
significant for the US, Canada and the US constitute an overlapping 
security environment. Territorial defence, terrorism, criminality, 
counter-espionage, cybercrime, infrastructure protection and border 
security can’t be effectively managed by the US without a close 
partnership with Canada.  
Australia is a strategic military partnership with the US. While the US 
must defend Canada to defend the US, the US-Australia defence 
partnership is slightly less compulsory, but only slightly, as World War 
Two in the Pacific illustrated. Australia has developed a high level of 
expertise in neighbouring countries such as Indonesia.  
Fyffe 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Special Proceedings  
 
 
Page 4 
New Zealand as a small nation is not as indispensable as Australia, but 
it has significant SIGINT capacity to its North and East in Polynesia and 
South America.  
Firth, and perhaps most obviously, the Five Eyes countries are all 
English-speaking, except for Canada, whose S&I public servants work 
in English and French. This means that intelligence does not have to be 
translated for transmission to partners, and senior officials can 
communicate easily. The need for translating materials is an important 
obstacle for intelligence partners who wish to share large volumes of 
information. Intelligence distributed among the five eyes partners is 
usually already translated from another language into English. Adding a 
further translation would increase the dangers of misinterpretation.  
For Canada, the advantage of the Five Eyes is access to a far greater 
body of intelligence than we could ever afford on our own. Our 
challenge has been making a strong contribution, which we have done 
with CSE as the centrepiece, but also by contribution through every 
branch of our security and intelligence community, with foreign affairs 
reporting added from time to time.  
The Five Eyes allies share almost every type of S&I material: SIGINT, 
HUMINT, Imagery, analysis, and much more. Operational cooperation 
is high.  
What keeps this alliance strong, since it is obvious all five partners have 
their own interests and foreign policy objectives?  
Historical Closeness: The Five Eyes Partners have a common historical 
association and a common philosophical and legal inheritance. This has 
been reinforced by a history of working together, fighting on the same 
side, and sharing ideas on many aspects of government. The historic 
closeness is reinforced by frequent meetings and joint operations.  
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Common Values: All five countries have traditionally had similar 
approaches to the rule of law, human rights, democracy, open markets 
and open societies.  
Multiple governmental linkages: The five countries cooperate across 
many areas apart from security and intelligence and have historically 
had a high comfort level in interacting with each other.  
Parallel linkages at the political level: Although the Five Eyes 
partnership is run by officials, politicians are very aware that they are 
drawing on a common intelligence base and will see intelligence 
reporting and analysis from allies.  
Give/Get: While contributions to the alliance are not equal or 
proportionate, all governments have made contributions to the alliance 
a priority.  
High value for all partners: All benefit from sharing high quality, 
properly sourced and verified intelligence.  
No spying on partners: Intelligence operations against a partner would 
imperil the alliance. This does not mean there is no seeking of 
information or writing of assessments. Diplomatic reporting is 
supplemented by the exchange of information through liaison officers 
and liaison visits.  
Originator control: Allies control their own intelligence in which others 
may not share without permission.  
Distribution caveats: There is no expectation that countries will share 
everything. Partners keep some intelligence that is sensitive for policy 
or collection reasons to themselves. We have Canadian Eyes Only, just 
as the US has NOFORN. It is common for reporting to be sanitized and 
non-sharable information removed.  
Recognition of Mutual Threat: We face similar threats, whether they are 
cyberattacks, discriminatory trade practices, or the safety of our citizens. 
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Obviously, even allies have trade disagreements, although the current 
situation with punitive tariffs imposed on close allies is exceptional.  
Strong Personal relationships: Agency heads and others meet regularly 
and build strong personal connections.  
Since these are the conditions that maintain the Five Eyes Alliance, the 
threats to it are also clear. If foreign policies or foreign policy values and 
goals diverge, the justification for sharing intelligence starts to erode. If 
partners share less or share less of quality, the overall partnership would 
lose value. Different legal principles can inhibit sharing and create 
process blockages. All partners must maintain high-security standards. 
Adversaries know that penetrating the service on one country will 
expose intelligence from another country. This is one of the reasons 
highly sensitive material is often not shared. Sometimes there must be 
security standards far exceeding the norm, for example in running a 
high-value penetration agent.  
Some of the potential threats to an alliance are currently at play within 
the Five Eyes  
The Five Eyes Partnership is an intelligence-sharing alliance. It exists, 
however, because the diplomatic objectives of the partners are 
compatible, the intelligence agency leaders feel a close kinship with 
their counterparts, and their militaries share common assumptions, 
general objectives, and even equipment. Political backing for the 
partnership has been strong. The strong benefit to all partners and the 
long-standing relationship has protected the alliance even when political 
disputes have been serious.  
Above all, the common civilizational heritage of the Five Eyes partners 
provides the most essential adhesive of all—a common set of values. 
With common values, a partnership can survive transitory disagreements 
on specifics. Without common values trust will falter.  
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These foundational elements are not as solid as they were. Relationships 
between the allies have become tense, although this has impacted NATO 
and key bilateral pacts, but so far not the Five Eyes.  
The United Kingdom is leaving the EU, after which it may lose some of 
its value as a link with European partners. Many observers feel the UK 
will suffer economically from Brexit. This could lead to a loss in 
intelligence capacity if it generates severe budget problems.  
All Five Eyes Partners are working to achieve a balanced relationship 
with China, but not all have come out in the same place. Australia has 
increasingly pushed back against aggressive Chinese economic and 
political activities in Australia. New Zealand has been less alarmed, 
although that too may be changing. Canada is trying to achieve a positive 
trade relationship while there are increasing concerns about the 
infrastructure risks of too much Chinese participation in the Canadian 
economy. The US is engaged in a tariff confrontation with China, with 
allies supportive at least of the objective, but unconvinced that a tariff 
war is the best way forward. Most are also suffering from damaging 
tariffs imposed on their own economies by the United States.  
The most significant change, of course, is the retreat of the United States 
from alliance leadership under the current presidency, accompanied by 
a brutal disregard for friends and a puzzling enthusiasm for authoritarian 
rulers.  
There have been tense moments in relationships between Canada and 
the US in the past, but the recent interactions between Canada and the 
US are unique in recent decades. We have seen instances of poor 
personal relationships between a US president and a Canadian Prime 
Minister before, but not volleys of personal insults. Disagreements over 
facts are common in trade disputes, but the pure invention of statistics 
undermines mutual confidence. The tough bargaining of the Yankee 
trader is embedded in Canadian literature as well as direct experience, 
but a threat to destroy the Canadian economy by attacking the auto sector 
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with a knockout blow is tough to endure from a former close friend. And 
of course, classifying the export of Canadian steel and aluminum as a 
security risk to the United States means that either Canada is not a 
reliable partner for the US, or the US is not a reliable partner for Canada.  
Do we all have similar values? Even after discounting the occasional 
instance of virtue signalling in Canada, it is apparent that the values gulf 
is wide and getting wider. The Five Eyes systems support democracy. 
The adherence of intelligence communities to a high standard of ethical 
behaviour is an essential protection against the harm that can result from 
tempting shortcuts. If the essential elements of democracy at home and 
abroad are diminished, will the ethical standards of the S&I community 
hold?  
The centrifugal pressures may prove to be temporary. Even if they 
persist, it is quite possible that the strong internal coherence of the Five 
Eyes partners will remain despite turbulence at the political level.  
Is there a serious possibility that the Five Eyes Partnership is at risk?  
It is a lower profile than NATO. Unlike NATO there have not been 
serious issues around funding—everyone knows why contributions are 
unequal. The leaders of the intelligence communities are officials, and 
politicians seldom come together as representatives of the Five Eyes, 
and when they do the meetings are private and communiques are not 
normally issued.  
The danger to the partnership is anything that would cause public 
attention and debate.  
We have already seen one crisis generated by a critical foreign policy 
divergence—the invasion of Iraq. Canada was not part of the armed 
coalition and there was a serious threat of diminished access to US 
intelligence, and to our standing within the alliance. It is possible that 
this situation could be repeated if the US took aggressive action against 
a country while Canada did not participate.  
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A related danger would be manifest if there was a feeling that Canadian 
intelligence was being used for purposes Canada did not support. This 
arose in the Mahar Arar case, with Canadian-supplied suspicions being 
used to justify his rendition to Syria. As a result, more restrictive security 
intelligence sharing rules were implemented.  
I think the US intelligence community has won the debate with the 
President over whether torture is acceptable, but if that position changed, 
Canada would have to be extremely wary of the origin and reliability of 
intelligence on terrorism risks.  
This would also be a danger if there were a divergence on the major 
policy question, not necessarily leading to war. If Canada felt its 
intelligence supported policies it opposed, such the US rejection of the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action dealing with Iran’s nuclear 
program, this could hinder full sharing. The same could apply to US 
intelligence used by an ally to argue against US policies.  
A related possibility would be a suspicion on the part of Canada that the 
flow of intelligence to this country was being dictated by the political 
priorities of a partner. Before 911 intelligence had restricted acceptance 
in Canadian foreign policy formulation because of suspicions among 
diplomats that American intelligence reflected American diplomatic 
priorities. This will always true to a degree—countries collect the 
intelligence they think they will need. It is more serious to mutual 
confidence if intelligence is filtered for political impact on a partner, and 
not just for reasons of internal decision-making or security.  
Another potential danger is punishment for a security lapse. All of the 
Five Eyes partners are the focus of attention by Russia, China, and other 
intelligence services, but high-security standards are essential for the 
preservation of the alliance. Canada had to take swift action after the 
Delisle case. There have been many US intelligence defeats as well as 
victories, but this would not protect us from access retaliation if Canada 
were responsible for a major loss of allied intelligence during a period 
Fyffe 
 
The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare 
Special Proceedings  
 
 
Page 10 
of tense allied relationships. After all, most of the intelligence and assets 
at risk are those of the United States.  
We might see a shift in the type of person who leads US intelligence 
agencies. So far we have seen professionals or partisans with a strong 
intelligence community background or commitment. But there have 
been multiple personnel changes in the White House and in major 
departments of senior officials who do not meet the President’s 
expectations. The Five Eyes has put a lot of emphasis on ensuring that 
officials know each other and are comfortable in their interactions. If 
senior US officials were less attached to the value of the partnership, one 
of the other crises might be more likely—exclusion of a partner, 
manipulation of the intelligence flow, lack of confidence in a partner’s 
intelligence, or punishment for a security lapse.  
Some of the issues, particularly those relating to process and the 
treatment of individuals, are particularly relevant to terrorism, still 
necessarily a preoccupation of Five Eyes intelligence agencies.  
The US pullback from leadership and the questioning of the value of 
alliances comes at a very bad time. We have entered a long era which 
will be dominated by three global forces.  
First, a new bipolar global power structure is being established. One pole 
is China—authoritarian, ambitious, and economically strong. It is 
establishing a global trade network placing China at the centre of a 
network of countries contributing raw resources, knowledge and 
markets. This new empire is based on wealth, careful planning, 
authoritarian governance and a willingness to exploit every advantage, 
regardless of the norms of the international community.  
The alternate pole, as it has been for decades, is the United States. Until 
now it has been the willing leader of a global network of open 
democratic and open market countries believing in human rights and 
freedoms. The US and friends have worked for a coherent international 
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order that promotes prosperity and avoids war. The United States was 
often criticized for falling short of its own ideas, but the ideals were 
there.  
China is increasing its attractiveness as a partner for many countries. The 
United States is pushing allies away.  
The second major force is the new phase of the information revolution— 
the accelerating move to artificial intelligence. This will change 
everything from industry to scenarios for military conflict. It is also very 
likely to eliminate many jobs from industrial societies, escalating the 
discontent that is already evident as the current wave of IT and trade 
transformation eliminates many of the middle-income careers that 
softened the gap between rich and poor. Economic instability drives 
political realignment.  
Third, we have already reached the era of high impact global climate 
change, and the harm to every aspect of life and governance will 
intensify. Governments will be increasingly preoccupied with disaster 
costs, global immigration, food security and personal and national 
mitigation strategies. National and global instability is at high risk.  
The various forms that the western alliance takes—NATO, the EU, the 
Five Eyes—provide forums for concerted action. International 
organizations have been forums for debate and reconciliation— 
imperfect without a doubt, but still, the best hope for global leadership 
to resolve global problems.  
The Five Eyes partnership is low profile and is not a political 
organization. This gives it some potential for durability even in difficult 
times.  
If the current tensions within the western alliance continue beyond one 
presidential term, the risks to the Five Eyes Alliance will increase. This 
would be disastrous for the Canadian intelligence community, and 
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harmful to its role in protecting Canada, contributing to global conflict 
resolution, and supporting informed decision-making.  
It would signal a further loss of unity in the western alliance. At a time 
when strong leadership from the western democracies is critical to 
human rights, global prosperity, and the health of the biosphere, this 
would be an irredeemable tragedy.  
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